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I. STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This case started with the Respondents’ John S. Kirby and Vicki L. Kirby (“Kirbys”)

verified complaint for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and injunctive relief filed against the
Appellants’ Mark Scotton and Dawn Scotton (“Scottons”). The Scottons control an irrigation
easement over their land that for years has continually flooded the Kirbys’ neighboring land with
excess water. After numerous attempts to get the Scottons to dig a simple ditch on their property
to prevent further flooding, the Kirbys were forced to file suit. Then, the Scottons and their
attorney failed to answer the complaint for 72 days after it was due, even after receiving written
notice of intent to take default, and in fact engaged in three months of delay that the District
Court found amounted to “dilatory conduct.” The District Court entered default, had a hearing on
damages, denied the Scottons’ motion to set aside the default, and entered a default judgment.
B.

Course of proceedings in District Court
The Kirbys’ complaint was filed on July 8, 2016. (R. 2, 7). The Scottons were served on

August 31, 2016. (R. 2). No answer or notice of appearance was filed by the deadline under
I.R.C.P. 12. (R. 2). The Kirbys moved for entry of default and a default judgment on October 24,
2016. (R. 2). The District Court ultimately entered default on November 18, 2016. (R. 3, 19).
The Scottons filed an answer on December 1, 2016 and then moved to set aside the entry
of default. (R. 3) The District Court held a hearing on default damages on December 15, 2016,
but held the decision in abeyance until it could decide the Scottons’ motion to set aside the entry
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of default. (R. 3, 69). On January 19, 2017, the Court heard that motion and issued a written
Order Denying Set Aside of Default denying the motion to set aside default on February 21,
2017. (R. 4, 81-83). On the same day, the Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on
Default Damages and entered a Final Judgment awarding the Kirbys $10,952.23, and other
relief. (R. 4, 69, 76).
C.

Statement of Facts
The Scottons’ recitation of the facts leading up to the entry of default glosses over key

events and ignores what the District Court correctly found was “dilatory conduct.”
The complaint in this case was filed on July 8, 2016. (R. 2, 7). On July 14th, 2016 Kirbys’
counsel sent a copy of the Complaint along with an acceptance of service to Trevor Hart. (R. 54).
Mr. Hart had previously communicated with the Kirbys’ counsel on behalf of the Scottons
regarding the underlying dispute. (R. 34). Mr. Hart never confirmed his representation by
returning a signed acceptance of service. (R. 54). After no return of the acceptance of service, the
Kirbys had the Scottons personally served with the complaint on August 31, 2016. (R. 54).
After service of the complaint, the Scottons never filed an answer, nor did Mr. Hart or
any other attorney file a notice of appearance on behalf of the Scottons. (R. 2-3). After waiting
24 days, the Kirbys filed a motion for entry of default and sent the default filings directly to the
Scottons as no confirmation from Mr. Hart had been received that he was in fact representing the
Scottons in the case. (R. 17-18). In response to that motion, Mr. Hart emailed the Kirbys’
counsel on October 27, 2016 and requested the motion for default be withdrawn. (R. 51). Kirbys’
counsel agreed and gave notice to Mr. Hart, in writing, that he had until November 4, 2016 to file
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an answer. (R. 58). That same day her office emailed the clerk of the District Court. (R. 59). That
email, on which Mr. Hart was copied, stated: “Please withdraw our Motion for Entry of Default
against Mr. and Mrs. Scotton. We are in negotiation to secure an answer to our complaint. The
answer will be filed next week sometime or if not we will refile our Motion for Entry of
Default.” (R. 59).
On November 4, 2016, no answer being received, despite the one week written notice
given Mr. Hart, Scottons’ counsel’s office contacted the clerk of the District Court indicating the
desire to proceed with the default and inquiring about the procedure for renewing the request for
default, specifically if she would need to “refile” the documents. (R. 60). The clerk indicated the
previous documents would be provided to the District Court. (R. 60). Default was ultimately
entered on November 18, 2016. (R. 19).
From July 14 to August 31, 2016, Scottons’ counsel failed to return a signed acceptance
of service. From August 31, 2016 onwards, Scottons knew they had been personally served and
had to answer the Complaint, yet no notice of appearance or answer was filed. From October
24th, 2016 onwards, Scottons’ counsel was aware the Kirbys were seeking default, yet filed no
notice of appearance or answer. On October 27th, 2016, Scottons’ counsel was given one weeks’
notice of intent to take default. (R. 58, 59). Yet, it was not until after default was entered on
November 18, 2016 that an answer was filed. Even then, the answer was not filed until
December 1, 2016, 72 days after an answer was due.
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
As an additional issue on appeal, the Kirbys request their attorney’s fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. This is more fully discussed in Section
IV.D below.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside an entry of
default for an abuse of discretion. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623
(2004) (citing McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 933, 854 P.2d 274, 276 (Ct. App. 1993)); see
also AgStar Financial Services, ACA v. Gordon Paving Co., Inc., 161 Idaho 817, 391 P.3d 1287
(2017). Such a denial will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion clearly
appears. Id. “The power of a trial court to grant or deny relief under Rule 55(c) is discretionary.”
Id. (citing Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 559, 561 (1992)).
“Where the trial court makes factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, applies correct
criteria pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(c) to those facts, and makes a logical conclusion, the court will
have acted within its discretion.” Id.
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Scottons’
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying the Scottons’ motion to set
aside entry of default and its decision should be affirmed. The District Court reviewed the
procedural history of the case, the Scottons’ motion to set aside the default and briefs in support
and opposition, and all the affidavits, took the matter under advisement, and issued a written
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF
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decision denying the motion to set aside the entry of default. That decision stated and applied the
correct legal standards. The Scottons have not demonstrated any of the factual findings were
clearly erroneous and have failed to meet their burden.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), “The court may set aside an entry of ...
default for good cause, and it may set aside a default judgment under Rule 60(b).” I.R.C.P. 55
(c). One of the requirements of showing good cause is that the party asking the Court to set aside
default must also plead facts with particularity, which, if established, would constitute a defense
to the action. Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010); Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho
371, 283 P.3d 118 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in
Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007)). “Because judgments by default are not
favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the case on the
merits.” Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638, 115 P.3d 726, 729 (2005). “[T]he required
good cause showing to set aside a default under Rule 55(c) is ‘lower or more lenient than that
required to set aside a default judgment” under Rule 60(b).’” Dorion, 153 Idaho at 375, 283 P.3d
at 122 (quoting McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 936, 854 P.2d 274, 279 (Ct. App. 1993)).
The Court of Appeals has also ruled that whether the default was willful or whether
setting it aside would be prejudicial to the opposing party are “[o]ther primary considerations” in
the good cause analysis. Dorion, 153 Idaho at 374, 283 P.3d at 121. “The weight that a court
assigns both to the conduct of a party, when that conduct leads to entry of default, and to the
prejudice that would result to the opposing party if the default were set aside, is left to the
discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 375, 283 P.3d at 122.
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1. The District Court correctly entered default based upon the Scottons’
dilatory conduct
The District Court found that the Scottons did not make a showing of “good cause”
needed to set aside the entry of default and that Scottons’ conduct in failing to respond to the
complaint was dilatory. (R. 82). The District Court concluded that the delay “amounted to
dilatory conduct for more than three months.” (R. 83). The District Court found that the Scottons
failed “to accept service through their attorney, file a notice of appearance, motion to extend time
to answer, or answer between July 19, 2016 and November 4, 2016.” (R. 82). The District Court
found that “[t]he Defendants had repeated opportunities to accept service or appear in this
litigation over an extended period of time. The delay is beyond just engaging in settlement
negotiations and amounts to dilatory conduct for more than three months.” (R. 82-83).
These findings are amply supported by the record. The District Court summarized what
occurred in its decision:
Defense counsel sent a letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel in May 2016. Counsel for the
Plaintiffs had a conversation with the attorney believed to be the counsel for the
Defendants on July 13, 2016. The Complaint was delivered to that attorney for the
Defendants about July 14, 2016 but the acceptance of service was not signed by
defense counsel. No answer was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
12 and no notice of general or special appearance was filed under Rule 4.1. While
counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants may have engaged in settlement
discussions at that time, nothing was ever filed with the court. Then, the
Complaint was served on the Scottons on August 31, 2016—well after the time
Plaintiff's counsel would have returned from vacation. Still, after formal service
no answer was filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and no notice of
general or special appearance was filed under Rule 4.1. No motion to extend time
to answer was filed. The application for default was filed October 24, 2016. On
October 27, 2016, counsel for the Defendants admits he was aware of the default
application but, still nothing was filed with the court. The court entered default on
November 17, 2016. The Defendants then filed an untimely answer on December
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF
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1, 2016 and a Motion to Set Aside the Default on December 6, 2016. The Answer
is more of a general denial and does not plead with particularity and detail the
defenses.
(R. 82).
The record contains substantial evidence of a desire to simply delay the case as long as
possible. Over four months elapsed from the time Mr. Hart was provided the complaint with an
acceptance of service, (R. 34), to the time he filed an answer on behalf of the Scottons (thirteen
days after entry of default). (R. 21). Even after being personally served, the Scottons failed to file
a notice of appearance or answer with the Court for over three months. (R. 2-3).
Although the District Court entered default largely because of the Scottons’ dilatory
conduct, the Scottons argue on appeal that the District Court “did not consider willfulness in
denying Scottons’ motion.” (Appellants’ Br. at 6). Instead, according to the Scottons, the District
Court “ruled that Scottons’ mere tardiness created a lack of good cause to set aside the default.”
(Appellants’ Br. at 6-7).
First, that is a gross mischaracterization of the District Court’s Order Denying Set Aside
of Default. Rather, the Court’s Order recounted in detail the repeated failure of the Scottons to
act diligently in response to the Kirbys’ lawsuit. (R. 82-83). Nowhere did the Court hold the
problem was one of mere tardiness. The District Court found a pattern of unexcused delay in
answering the complaint that amounted to “dilatory conduct.” (R. 82-83). That conclusion is
indistinguishable from a finding that the failure to answer was willful. The plain meaning of
“dilatory” is “designed or tending to cause delay.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014),
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dilatory (giving as an example of how “dilatory” is used in a sentence: “the judge’s opinion
criticized the lawyer’s persistent dilatory tactics”).
Second, in support of their argument, the Scottons cite several federal cases that are
factually far afield from what occurred in this case. In Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Right Solution
Med. Supply, Inc., No. 12 Civ 0908, 2012 WL 6617422, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2012)
(unreported), the plaintiff obtained entry of default against one defendant one day after the
deadline for an answer, and two days after the deadline for the other defendant. The court
understandably held “mere tardiness in meeting a court deadline does not establish a willful
default.” In AIP Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. Ascension Tech. Grp. Ltd., No. 16 CIV. 9181 (LLS), 2017
WL 448963, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2017), the plaintiff obtained entry of default within days of
an answer being due, after defendants’ counsel had filed a notice of appearance and had
requested an extension of time to respond to the complaint. In Moreno-Godoy v. Gallet Dreyer &
Berkey, LLP, No. 14 CIV. 7082 PAE, 2015 WL 5737565, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015)
(unreported), the defendant did not answer, but never received any notice of intent to take
default, and failed to appear because he believed a co-defendant was representing his interests.
None of these cases have facts that resemble what occurred here. Even after being
personally served, the Scottons failed to file a notice of appearance or answer with the Court for
over three months. (R. 2-3). There was no rush to the courthouse to obtain a default. The
Scottons were served with the default filings, given more time to answer, yet still failed to do so.
The facts substantially support the District Court’s conclusion that the Defendants had failed to
show the requisite “good cause” in failing to timely answer the complaint.
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2. The Scottons were provided a weeks’ written notice of intent to take
default, yet still failed to answer the complaint
Further, the Scottons failed to file an answer or notice of appearance even after being
given notice of Kirbys’ intent to seek a default. The District Court specifically noted that “On
October 27, 2016, counsel for the Defendants admits he was aware of the default application but,
still, nothing was filed with the court.” (R. 82). Scottons’ counsel was specifically given written
notice via emails on October 27, 2016 that absent an answer filed by November 4th, default
would be sought. (R. 58, 59). The District Court acknowledged this one-week notice when it
found that the Defendants had failed to “. . . accept service through their attorney, to file a notice
of appearance, motion to extend time to answer, or answer between July 19, 2016 and November
4, 2016.” (R. 82). Scottons’ counsel does not deny he received the notice. (R. 27). Yet, still no
answer or notice of appearance was filed in the time given by Kirbys’ counsel, which exceeded
the three days required by the Rule. (R. 2-3). In fact, default was not entered for 22 days after the
Scottons’ counsel was informed in writing he had a week to file an answer. (R. 19).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a)(1) states that “if a party has appeared in the action,
that party must be served with 3 days’ written notice of the application for entry of default before
default may be entered.” I.R.C.P. 55(a) (1). “[T]he appearance required to trigger the three-day
notice requirement has been broadly defined, and is not limited to a formal court appearance.”
Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009). “A defendant who merely
‘indicates an intent to defend against the action’ can benefit from the notice requirement. Id.
(quoting Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984)). To
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constitute an appearance, the “defendant’s actions ‘must be responsive to plaintiff's formal
[c]ourt action,’ so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the dispute or to communicate to the
plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief.” Id. (quoting Baez v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that there has not been an
appearance merely because the plaintiff knew the defendant intended to resist the suit); see also
Ellis v. Ellis, 118 Idaho 468, 472, 797 P.2d 868, 872 (Ct. App.1990) (finding that the defendant
had not appeared when he rejected the petitioner’s divorce settlement proposal); Olson v.
Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 36, 720 P.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App.1986) (finding that preliminary
settlement discussions between the parties were not an appearance).
The Rule does not require any specific form of written notice of intent to seek default.
Under the analogous federal rule requiring written notice of an application for default judgment,
“notice of an application for the entry of a default judgment need not be in any particular form.
The major consideration is that the party is made aware that a default judgment may be entered
against him.” 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2687 (4th ed.). A court is within its discretion to
enter default and a default judgment where a party has received at least three days’ notice of
intent to take default yet failed to answer, and showed no meritorious defense. See Reeves v.
Wisenor, 102 Idaho 271, 629 P.2d 667 (1981). “The purpose of requiring notice only when the
defendant has entered an appearance is to protect plaintiffs in instances ‘when the adversary
process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.’” Meyers v. Hansen, 148
Idaho 283, 288, 221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) (quoting Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 665, 672

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF

Page 10

P.2d 231, 233 (1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108
Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985)).
In Reeves v. Wisenor, this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to deny relief from a
default judgment where the defendant had retained an attorney and had engaged in settlement
discussions with the plaintiff’s counsel. 102 Idaho 271, 271, 629 P.2d 667, 678 (1981). Yet, after
being provided a week’s notice of intent to take default, defendant failed to appear at the default
hearing. Id. The trial court entered default and default judgment. Id. This Court affirmed. Id. at
273, 629 P.2d at 669.
Just like the defendant in Reeves, the Scottons failed to act diligently when being given
notice of an application for default. Even assuming for argument’s sake that the Scottons
appeared in the action under a broad construction of “appearance,” the Scottons had ample notice
of the Kirbys’ intent to press for a default if their complaint was unanswered. Kirbys’ counsel
agreed and told Mr. Hart, in writing, that he had until November 4, 2016 to file an answer. (R.
58). It is undisputed that the Scottons’ counsel and the Scottons personally knew of the Kirbys’
intent to take default well in advance of the District Court’s actual entry of default. (R. 27, 58,
59).
It is patently unfair for the Scottons to fail to act diligently in response to the lawsuit but
then accuse the Kirbys of sharp dealing in simply trying to move forward with a lawsuit. Further,
if Mr. Hart desired to represent the Scottons in this case and make clear the Scottons intended to
defend, all he had to do was file a notice of appearance or return the acceptance of service. Now
with this appeal, just the issue of default is being litigated some fifteen months after the filing of
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the lawsuit. The Scottons had obligations to act diligently and promptly and failed to do so, and
despite having full notice of the Kirbys’ intent to seek default, failed to comply with the
applicable procedural rules.
B.

The Kirbys would be Prejudiced if Entry of Default were Set Aside

The Scottons argue the District Court failed to address the issue of prejudice when
rendering its decision. The Scottons further assert that the only prejudice at issue here would
have been a short delay caused by their untimely filing of their answer.
First, the fact that the District Court did not expressly address the prejudice to the Kirbys
is not reversible error. The Scottons do not cite any case, and the Kirbys are not aware of any,
where this Court has required trial courts to expressly make a finding of prejudice in ruling on a
motion to set aside a default. Rather, the weight assigned to factors such as the defaulted party’s
conduct or the prejudice to the other party are left to the discretion of the trial court. See Dorion,
153 Idaho at 374, 283 P.3d at 121.
Second, this argument could be made in many cases involving defaults. The Scottons
ignored their obligations under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. If a party who has been duly
served with a Summons and Complaint fails to act diligently, that party is at risk of default. It
cannot try and delay the matter, and then come into court after default and argue there would be
no prejudice to simply set aside the default and allow a short time to answer. If that is the
standard, there are no teeth to the various procedural rules governing appearing in an action and
answering a complaint.
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Third, the Scottons rely heavily on Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 283 P.3d 118 (Ct.
App. 2012) to argue that the District Court erred in not considering the issue of prejudice. Dorion
is distinguishable. In Dorion, the defendants initially appeared and answered the complaint, but
after fourteen months their attorney withdrew. 153 Idaho at 373, 283 P.3d at 120. Their new
attorney spoke to the plaintiff’s attorney on August 30 (after the time had expired for the
defendants to appear) and requested additional time for the defendants to decide whether to
retain him as their new attorney. Id. On September 1, plaintiff moved for default, which the court
granted on September 9. Id. On September 17, the defendants’ attorney filed a notice of
appearance and moved to set aside the default on the grounds that it was a result of a
miscommunication between the attorneys. Id.
There is little resemblance between the facts in Dorion and the facts here. Here, the
Scottons never appeared or answered prior to the entry of default. The case has not been litigated
for fourteen months. There was no confusion caused by the withdrawal of an attorney. There was
no ambiguity over whether default was being sought.
Rather, this case is about the willful neglect of obligations imposed by the rules. In Clear
Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, the Court upheld a default judgment where the defense counsel,
who repeatedly communicated with plaintiff’s counsel, had filed a motion to dismiss (rather than
answer) and then withdrew the motion. 123 Idaho 141, 142-43, 845 P.2d 559, 560-61 (1992).
After three weeks of inaction, plaintiff sent defendant’s counsel a notice of intent take default
twelve days later. 123 Idaho at 143, 845 P.2d at 561. Defendant failed to appear at the hearing
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and the trial court entered default. Id. This Court quoted from the trial court’s findings below,
which stated:
The civil rules do have meaning and it provides a mechanism to advance cases on
their merits. However, when one party intentionally neglects the rules then justice
demands default actions. The factual circumstances of this case require justice and
justice requires the upholding of the default judgment.
123 Idaho at 144, 845 P.2d at 562.
In other words, a party must abide by its obligations under rules or risk a default. The
trial court docket would grind to a halt if parties were permitted to delay matters until default is
sought and then come to court and argue there would be no prejudice if they are simply now
allowed to answer and defend the action. Further, the delay in this case is not inconsequential.
The Scottons failed to answer the complaint until 72 days after it was due, far more time than the
delay at issue in Clear Springs.
C.

The District Court Correctly Found that the Scottons Failed to Particularly
Plead a Meritorious Defense Needed to Establish “Good Cause” under Rule
55(c)

The District Court correctly found that the Scottons failed to satisfy the meritorious
defense needed to establish “good cause” under Rule 55(c). The District Court found that the
Scottons’ answer amounted to a general denial and that the Scottons had failed to plead any
defenses with particularity. (R. 82).
The Scottons’ recitation of the meritorious defense requirement in Dorion v. Keane omits
a key part of the holding. Consistent with this Court’s long-standing case law, the Court of
Appeals held that to establish a meritorious defense “factual details must be pled with
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particularity.” Dorion v. Keane, 153 Idaho 371, 283 P.3d 118 (App. 2012) (citing Idaho State
Police ex rel. Russell v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007)
and Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 224 P.3d 1138 (2010) (“a party may not rely on an ordinary
pleading to prove a meritorious defense”); see also Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 592
P.2d 66 (1979), disapproved of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho
935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985), (“Once a default has been entered the pleading of defensive matter
must go beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pled before default.”).
“It would be an idle exercise for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real
justiciable controversy. The defense matters must be detailed.” Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell
v. Parcel I: Lot 2 in Block 3, 144 Idaho 60, 63, 156 P.3d 561, 546 (2007). “Consequently, where
no meritorious defense is shown in support of a motion to set aside a default, a court does not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion.” Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 553, 224 P.3d 1138,
1142 (2010).
Instead of correctly setting out the applicable law, the Scottons quote Reinwald v.
Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 1017 (Ct. App. 1991) and Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511,
198 P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008), but those cases simply state that the meritorious defense
requirement is a question of the sufficiency of the pleading, which does not require a party to
prove its case, or even submit evidence. But, a party must still plead defenses with particularity.
That was not done in this case.
Rather, the District Court correctly held that the answer was simply a general denial and
general listing of affirmative defenses with little to no factual detail. The Scottons do not point to
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any specific factual details in their answer that would support any defense to the underlying
trespass action, much less a plausible defense. They do argue that they pleaded specific facts in
support of a right to offset. However, the Scottons’ answer only stated the following with respect
to offset:
Plaintiffs’ damages, if any, are subject to Defendants’ right of offset resulting
from Plaintiffs’ wrongful conduct, including trespass, nuisance, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, caused by Plaintiffs’ discharging their firearms in
the direction of Defendants’ home.
(R. 23).
This “defense” consists of nothing more than bare assertions and is not pled with
particularity. Without more factual information, this statement means nothing. It is a non-specific
theory and reflects nothing more than the Scottons’ “hope.” For a defense to be pled with
particularity, the pleading must set forth sufficient factual detail that, if proven, would entitle the
claimant to the relief requested. No such factual detail is remotely present in Scottons’ answer.
Further, this alleged “defense” is actually an unliquidated and unpled permissive
counterclaim. It is not a defense to the particular action brought by the Kirbys. The meritorious
defense factor is addressed to the potential windfall to the plaintiff of avoiding a determination of
his case on the merits where it appears the defendant has a defense that could defeat the
plaintiff’s claim. The “meritorious defense” requirement is concerned with the merits of the
plaintiff’s claims and whether the defendant could prevail against those claims, not whether the
defendant could assert some other unrelated counterclaim that could still be litigated in a separate
lawsuit.
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Here, the Scottons alleged a potential right to “offset” based on claims that are totally
unrelated to the Kirbys’ central claim of trespass based on overflow of water onto their property.
A possible counterclaim on an unrelated matter has no bearing on the meritorious defense
requirement. See Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10, 12, 592 P.2d 66, 68 (1979), disapproved
of on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985),
(noting the defendant had alleged as a defense a possible damage claim for breach of contract but
that it could not be determined whether the alleged breach of contract would be a compulsory or
permissive counterclaim); see also Urbana College v. Conway, 502 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985) (refusing to set aside default where defendant asserted counterclaim on an unrelated
incident).
Further, there is no relevance to the fact that the District Court decided not to award all
the Kirbys’ damages at the hearing. The meritorious defense requirement focuses on whether
factual details supporting a defense are pled with particularity. No defenses to the Kirbys
damages claims were detailed by the Scottons, in their answer or otherwise. Thus, the District
Court’s ability under Rule 55(b)(2) to have a hearing and “determine the amount of damages”
before entering a default judgment has no bearing on the meritorious defense requirement for
setting aside a prior entry of default.
D.

The Kirbys Should be Awarded their Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal

The Kirbys should be awarded their attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. The standard of
review on this appeal is whether an abuse of discretion “clearly appears.” McGloon v. Gwynn,
140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623 (2004). “Where the trial court makes factual findings that
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are not clearly erroneous, applies correct criteria pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(c) to those facts, and
makes a logical conclusion, the court will have acted within its discretion.” Id.
“An award of attorney fees on appeal is proper under I.C. § 12-121 only if this Court is
left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and
without foundation.” Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 810, 992 P.2d 1205, 1210 (1999). An award of
attorney fees is appropriate if the law is well-settled and the appellant has made no substantial
showing that the court below misapplied the law. Hunt v. Hunt, 137 Idaho 18, 23, 43 P.3d 777,
782 (2002). This Court recently ruled that it is frivolous and unreasonable to make a continued
argument without adding any new analysis or authority or bringing into doubt the existing law to
the issues raised below. Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005).
Here, the District Court’s decision is supported by substantial facts in the record and is
not clearly erroneous. The District Court’s factual findings regarding the Scottons’ dilatory
conduct are supported by the record, particularly in light of the written notice of default that the
Scottons’ counsel received 22 days before default was actually entered. The Scottons’ appeal
raises no new issues but simply asks this Court to second-guess a discretionary decision by the
trial court. As such, the Scottons bring this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation. The Court should award the Kirbys their attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kirbys respectfully request that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.
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